The Great Divide: The Political Process and Palestinian Discourse on the Social Networks.

The Great Divide: The Political Process and Palestinian Discourse on the Social Networks. By Udi Dekel and Orlit Perlov. INSS, Insight No. 453, August 11, 2013.

Dekel and Perlov:

An estimated one third of Palestinian society today are active users of social networks, which feature frequent discussions on Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian identity, internal Palestinian conflicts, the relationship between the population and its leaders, the economic situation, and the impact of regional changes. New Media has thus become a platform for an open Palestinian discussion that highlights the complexity and the different processes within Palestinian society in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. Interestingly, the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian talks has sparked a number of protests in Ramallah, but has not received significant attention within the domestic Palestinian discourse on the social media.

 

Although Palestinian society is sometimes perceived as monolithic, the geographic separation between Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem is echoed by differences in lifestyle, outlook, and ideology. There is a common Palestinian identity, but the realities on the ground dictate completely different areas of interest, so that the populations of these three areas share few mutual interests that are topics for discussion. Gaza is oriented toward Egypt and influenced by events there. The Arab residents of East Jerusalem conduct themselves in an Israeli context and are influenced by the discourse among Israeli Arabs, taking little interest in the discourse in the West Bank and Gaza. In the West Bank, the Arabs are influenced by what is happening in Jordan, politically, economically, and socially. The Arab Spring, political Islam, democratization, and the demand for justice, rights, and freedoms have had a completely different impact on the three entities.

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The Common Denominator. The three entities are united by their rejection of the existing leadership, concern about rising prices, and an unwillingness to compromise the “right of return.” Two primary themes that reveal common attitudes resound on the social media. The first is the denial of any legitimacy of Hamas and Fatah leaders, and therefore, the Palestinian public will consider any national political decision made by these leaders to be illegitimate. The second theme is opposition to concessions by these leaders on the “right of return” in the negotiations. Conceding the “right of return” is considered taboo, especially among young Palestinians who do not recognize Israel as a Jewish state (60 percent of Palestinians are under 30). Any agreement in which the Palestinian leadership gives up the “right of return” would likely elicit a sharp response and be seen as a blow to social justice and a violation of civil rights.

 

In conclusion, contrary to expectation, the main discussion on Palestinian social networking sites is not focused on the resumption of the peace process, rather on the daily fundamental problems of the population. Three separate entities are oriented toward their respective geographical neighbors: the Gaza Strip toward Egypt, the West Bank toward Jordan, and East Jerusalem toward Israel. The Hamas leadership in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank have lost much legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinians. They do not respond to civil society needs, and their policy does not enjoy public support. President Abbas has little support from the Palestinian public for resuming the peace process, and the common perception is that he is motivated by foreign interests and not by the desire to advance domestic Palestinians needs.

 

There is almost no discussion on the social media about violent resistance or calls for terrorist activity against Israel. The young Palestinian society advocates a social struggle over justice and civil rights, not necessarily by means of violence.